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Abstract The well-known Blackwell’s theorem states the equivalence of sta-
tistical informativeness and economic valuableness. C¸elen (2012) generalizes
this theorem, which is well-known for subjective expected utility (seu), to
maxmin expected utility (meu) preferences. We demonstrate that the under-
lying definition of the value of information used in C¸elen (2012) is in contradic-
tion with the principle of recursively defined utility. As a consequence, C¸elen’s
framework features dynamic inconsistency. Our main contribution consists in
the definition of a value of information for meu preferences that is compatible
with recursive utility and thus respects dynamic consistency.
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1 Introduction
For decades economists have been studying the relationship between decision-
making under uncertainty and the so-called value of information. A famous
and well-known result in this context is Blackwell’s theorem (Blackwell 1953)
stating that an experiment is more valuable than another if and only if the
same experiment is more informative than the latter. In order to obtain this
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equivalence (e.g. Cre´mer 1982), a standard assumption has been that decision-
makers are subjective expected utility (seu) maximizers, cf. Savage (1954).
The objective of C¸elen (2012) is to extend the Blackwell theorem to meu
preferences, which were axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). In this
note we demonstrate that C¸elen’s proof relies on a value of information for meu
preferences that is not defined via backward induction and thus is incompatible
with the intertemporal extension of meu by Epstein and Schneider (2003). In
particular, optimal strategies in C¸elen’s framework prescribe decisions condi-
tional on signal realizations that an meu decision-maker will not find optimal
to adhere to once those signal realizations have been observed. In this sense,
C¸elen’s framework features dynamic inconsistency. Our contribution is to de-
fine a value of information that is compatible with the recursive intertemporal
formulation of meu preferences by Epstein and Schneider (2003).
2 Framework and definition of the value of information
in C¸elen (2012)
In the following, we adopt C¸elen’s framework and notation. Let Ω := {ω1, . . . , ωn}
be the finite set of states and X := {a1, . . . , aχ} the finite set of actions
available to a decision-maker. Moreover, let ∆(Ω) and ∆(X) be the set of
all probability distributions defined on Ω and X, respectively. Let further
u : Ω×X → R be a utility function and u with uij = u(ωi, aj) the correspond-
ing utility matrix. An seu decision-maker is characterized by (pi,u), where
pi ∈ ∆(Ω) is a prior over the states.
An experiment is a tuple (S,p) with the signal space S = {s1, . . . , sσ} and
the Markov matrix p with pij = Pr(sj|ωi) for sj ∈ S. C¸elen introduces a
strategy as a vector valued mapping f : S → ∆(X), thus characterizing all
(mixed) actions the decision maker plans to take after observing certain signal
realizations s. The σ×χ-matrix f is defined such that (fi1, · · · , fiχ) := f(si).
In this framework, C¸elen determines the value of the experiment (S,p) for
a given strategy f as
Uf(pi,u)(S,p) =
∑
j
Pr(sj)
∑
i
Pr(ωi|sj)
∑
k
fjku(ωi, ak) (1)
=
∑
j
∑
i
pijpii
∑
k
fjkuik (by Bayes’ rule) . (2)
With a strategy f ∗ maximizing (2), C¸elen defines U∗(pi,u)(S,p) = Uf
∗
(pi,u)(S,p) as
the value of the experiment for an seu decision-maker.
2
Building on this, C¸elen extends the definition of the value of an experiment
to the class of meu preferences. For that purpose, he characterizes an meu
decision-maker by (A, u), where A ⊂ ∆(Ω) is a convex and compact set of
priors. As a counterpart of U∗(pi,u)(S,p), he defines
W∗(A,u) = max
f
min
pi∈A
Uf(pi,u)(S,p) (3)
as the value of an experiment (S,p) for an meu decision-maker. It is expression
(3) that C¸elen relies on in his proof of the generalized Blackwell’s theorem.
3 A recursively defined MEU value of information
It is insightful to note that C¸elen’s framework essentially constitutes an in-
tertemporal setting with two periods. In the second period, after observing
a signal realization, the decision maker takes a (mixed) action. In the first
period, before observing the signal realization, the value of the experiment
(S,p) is determined. C¸elen accounts for the intertemporal structure insofar as
he considers strategies, that is complete contingent plans for appropriate play
after observing signal realizations.
His formulation, however, is in contrast to the usual intertemporal formu-
lation of meu preferences that is provided by Epstein and Schneider (2003).
One of the main characteristics of their recursive definition of intertemporal
meu is the compatibility with backward induction. We follow the approach
in Epstein and Schneider (2003) and develop an alternative definition of the
value of information for meu preferences.
According to backward induction, the first step to define a value of informa-
tion is to determine the value of the final decision given that the decision maker
chooses an optimal action for all possible signal realizations sj, j = 1, . . . , σ.
For meu preferences this value is
V (Mj) = max
g∈∆(X)
min
µ∈Mj
Eµ[u](g) , (4)
where Eµ[u](g) =
∑
k,i gkµi uik denotes the expected utility under action g ∈
∆(X) and ex-post belief µ. The optimal action is determined considering the
worst posterior µ ∈Mj. Formally, the set of posteriors isMj = {pi(·|sj) : pi ∈ A},
where pi(·|sj) denotes the conditional probability of the prior pi ∈ ∆(Ω) given
the signal sj. We obtain pi(·|sj) via Bayes’ rule and update each prior pi in
this way.1
1Epstein and Schneider (2007) show that further restrictions on the setM can be made.
For the sake of simplicity, you may think of full Bayesian updating.
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Building on (4), we can define the value of the experiment (S,p) for meu
preferences as
V(A,u) = min
pi∈A
∑
i,j
piipijV (Mj) . (5)
As usual, the value of information is obtained by taking the expectation over
all possible signal realizations. Due to meu preferences the value of the ex-
periment is the worst of those expectations. This alternative way of defining
the value of an experiment is in line with the intertemporal model of recursive
utility under multiple priors as introduced in Epstein and Schneider (2003,
2007).
The key characteristic of (5) is that optimal actions are determined with
the maxmin rule for each signal realization sj individually. In particular, the
worst posterior in (4) in general depends on the signal realization sj. This
is in contrast to (3). By following the derivation of the seu counterpart,
essentially the step from (1) to (2), C¸elen silently assumes that the worst
prior from the ex-ante perspective coincides with the preimage of all worst
posteriors, irrespective of the signal realization. For the seu decision-maker
this argumentation is innocent as there is a unique prior, and thus a unique
posterior as well. For the meu decision-maker, however, this argument is in
conflict with backward induction.
In the appendix, we demonstrate that the conflict of C¸elen’s framework
with intertemporal recursive utility can be made even more concrete. We
provide an example in which the optimal strategy derived in C¸elen’s framework
prescribes actions that are different from what an meu decision-maker will
actually do after observing those signals realizations.2 This supports our claim
that the value of information for meu preferences should be defined by (5).
By construction, our definition of the value of information is compatible with
dynamic consistency.
2One could think that the reason we observe this form of dynamic inconsistency is the
missing assumption of rectangularity of the prior set, a key assumption in Epstein and
Schneider (2003) to ensure dynamic consistency within an intertemporal setting of recursive
utility. But this is not the case. Even though C¸elen’s setting is not fully transferable to the
setting of Epstein and Schneider, in particular the analysis in Epstein and Schneider (2007)
suggests that rectangularity is no issue in this setting, simply because the learning process
is defined via conditional one-step-ahead conditionals, as required by Epstein and Schneider
(2003). The reason for the violation of dynamic consistency in C¸elen’s framework is that
intertemporal utility is defined in a non-recursive way, thus incompatible with dynamic
consistency right from the start.
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4 Results and Discussion
We have shown that C¸elen’s proof of Blackwell’s theorem only applies to a
value of information that is defined in a non-recursive utility framework. We
have offered a definition for the value of information derived via backward
induction, thus compatible with the dynamic consistent intertemporal axiom-
atization of Epstein and Schneider (2003). Consequently, we argue that the
proof of Blackwell’s theorem should deal with expression (5) as the definition
of the value of information for meu preferences. This proof is still pending.
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A Example demonstrating the dynamic inconsistency
of C¸elen’s framework
We restrict the number of states of the world Ω = {ω1, ω2}, actions X = {a1, a2} and signal
realizations S = {s1, s2} to two. Payoffs are specified by u11 = 1, u12 = −1, u22 = 2 and
u21 = 0. This is a simple example of a setting in which the decision maker wants to learn
the true ω because action a1 is optimal if ω = ω1 and action a2 is optimal if ω = ω2.
For the signal likelihood λ = p11 = p22 we assume 1/2 < λ < 3/4 and specify the set of
priors as A = {(pi1, 1− pi1) : 1/4 ≤ pi1 ≤ 3/4}.
Using equation (2), we obtain that the optimal strategy f∗ in C¸elen’s framework is
f∗(s1) = (1, 0) , f∗(s2) = (1/2, 1/2) . (6)
In words, the optimal strategy in the C¸elen framework consists of taking action a1 if s = s1
and mixing over actions a1 and a2 with equal weights if s = s2.
Next, we demonstrate that an meu decision-maker operating with the principle of back-
ward induction would deviate from f∗ as soon as the signal materializes. The decision rule
after observing a signal realization sj is given in (4), where g is a randomization over actions
a1 and a2, and Mj ⊂ ∆(Ω) is the set of posteriors that depends on the set of priors A, the
likelihood p, and the signal realization sj observed. After simple algebra we get
g∗(s1) = (3/4, 1/4) and g∗(s2) = (3/4, 1/4) . (7)
In words, the optimal action of the meu decision-maker, both after receiving s = s1 and
s = s2, is to mix over actions a1 and a2 with the ratio 3 to 1. This is in contrast to the
behavior prescribed in (6). Our example thus demonstrates the dynamic inconsistency in
C¸elen’s framework.
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